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The empirical finding that entrepreneurs tend to invest a large share of their wealth in their 
own firms despite comparably low returns and high risk has become known as the private 
equity premium puzzle. This paper provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that lower 
risk aversion of entrepreneurs, and not necessarily credit constraints, may explain this puzzle. 
The analysis is based on a large, representative panel data set for Germany, which provides 
information on asset portfolios and experimentally validated risk attitudes. The results show 
that both the ownership probability and the conditional portfolio share of private business 
equity significantly increase with higher risk tolerance. 
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1  Introduction 
Why do entrepreneurs invest a large share of their wealth in their own firms, despite the high 
risk associated with such an undiversified portfolio? The entrepreneurial risk-taking is not 
compensated by a premium on expected returns, as documented by Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002), and thus represents, in their wording, a ‘private equity premium puzzle’.
2 
One possible explanation for the puzzle may be that external  financing may  be  costly in 
imperfect financial markets due to asymmetric information (Gentry and Hubbard, 2004, page 
21).  In  other  words,  entrepreneurs  would  like  to  diversify,  but  face  credit  constraints. 
Hintermaier and Steinberger (2005) present a theoretical model of occupational choice over 
the life cycle under borrowing constraints and imperfect information about the profitability of 
potential  businesses,  which  is  able  to  generate  the  empirical  finding.  An  alternative 
explanation may be lower risk aversion of entrepreneurs (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2002, page 772; Gentry and Hubbard, 2004, page 21f). In this case, entrepreneurs’ portfolios 
may result from unconstrained individual optimization, and the private equity premium puzzle 
does not necessarily indicate frictions in the capital market. 
This paper provides the first empirical investigation of the heterogeneous risk tolerance 
explanation  by  analyzing  the  relationship  between  risk  attitudes  and  entrepreneurial 
investment. The results confirm the hypothesis that higher individual risk tolerance increases 
both the probability of holding private business equity, and its share in the asset portfolio 
conditional  on  ownership.  The  most  risk  tolerant  individuals  have  an  8  times  higher 
probability of owning private business equity than the most risk averse individuals, and the 
portfolio share of the most risk tolerant entrepreneurs is 31.5 % higher than that of the most 
risk averse entrepreneurs. 
                                                 
2 In contrast, the classical public equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) is concerned with the much 
higher returns to public equity stocks in comparison to safe government bonds.   2 
Recent literature has provided evidence that lower risk aversion increases the probability 
of being or becoming an entrepreneur (van Praag and Cramer, 2001; Cramer et al., 2002; 
Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2008). Consistently with that, the self-employed are found to 
be less risk averse than employees (Hartog et al., 2002; Barsky et al., 1997). As this literature 
already shows that low risk aversion is an important characteristic of entrepreneurship, it is 
straightforward  to  proceed  further  and  investigate  the  relationship  with  entrepreneurial 
investment.
3 In contrast to the existing literature, this analysis addresses potential endogeneity 
of the risk attitude. 
The  new  evidence  on  risk  aversion  and  entrepreneurial  investment  is  based  on  the 
German  Socio-Economic  Panel,  a  large,  representative  panel  survey  of  the  German 
population.  Besides  a  rich  variety  of  socio-economic  background  variables,  it  provides 
information on personal wealth, asset portfolios, and measures of individual risk attitudes. 
The behavioral relevance of the survey measures of risk attitudes has been validated in a field 
experiment  by  Dohmen  et  al.  (2005).  Section  2  describes  the  data  in  more  detail.  The 
empirical  methodology  in  this  paper,  as  discussed  in  section  3,  takes  into  account  both 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of the risk attitude. Section 
4 presents the estimation results, and section 5 concludes with policy implications. 
2  Data on Private Equity and Risk Attitudes 
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is provided by the German Institute of 
Economic  Research  (DIW  Berlin),  is  a  representative  yearly  panel  survey  covering  about 
22,000 individuals living in 12,000 households in Germany. Wagner et al. (2007) provide a 
detailed description of the data. The waves of  2002 and 2007 included a special module 
collecting information about private wealth. The interviewers asked for the market value of 
                                                 
3 Uncertainty is increasing in the level of entrepreneurial investment in the model of Fraser and Greene (2006), 
for example. In a related study, Barasinska, Schäfer, and Stephan (2008) analyzed the relationship between risk 
aversion and the number and combination of different asset classes held by private households.   3 
personally  owned  real  estate  (owner-occupied  housing,  other  property,  mortgage  debt), 
financial assets,  tangible assets, private life and pension insurance, consumer credits, and, 
most importantly for this analysis, private business equity (net market value; own share in 
case of a business partnership). The wording of the question for private equity is reported in 
Appendix B. In contrast to a similar wealth module in the SOEP questionnaire of 1988, which 
collected wealth information at the household level, in 2002 and 2007 the information was 
elicited at the individual level (for a discussion see Frick et al., 2007). This allows connecting 
personal wealth to individual risk attitudes. Since 2002, the SOEP has been enriched with a 
sample of high-income households (in 2002, this subsample comprised 2,671 individuals in 
1,224 households with monthly net income above 3,835 euro). The oversampling of these 
households ensures that this analysis takes into account entrepreneurial investment by the 
rich, who hold an important share of aggregate private business equity. 
The dependent variable sit in this analysis is defined as the share of private business 







= .  (1) 
The variable gross wealthit is obtained by adding up the personal shares
4 of all the items in the 
wealth questionnaires: 
gross wealthit = owner-occupied housingit + other propertyit + financial assetsit +  
tangible assetsit + private life and pension insuranceit + private equityit. (2) 
Thus, gross wealth is defined as wealth which is convertible into cash on the market and does 
not  include  human  capital  or  statutory  pension  insurance  entitlements.  Mortgage  debt  on 
owner-occupied  housing  and  other  property  and  consumer  credits  are  not  deducted  (this 
                                                 
4 With regard to owner-occupied housing, other property, and financial assets, respondents are asked to state the 
total value and the share they personally own. The variables used in equation (2) and reported in Table 1 refer to 
the values of the personal shares, i.e. the total values multiplied with the personal shares. For the other asset 
classes including private business equity, the interviewers directly asked for the values of the personally owned 
shares.   4 
would yield net worth), as the portfolio split, rather than the leverage decision, is the focus of 
this paper. This definition ensures that sit always lies in the interval from 0 to 1. 
New measures of individual risk attitudes were included in the SOEP waves of 2004 and 
2006. Respondents were asked to indicate their willingness to take risks on an 11-point scale 
ranging from 0 (complete unwillingness) to 10 (complete willingness); the exact wording is 
provided  in  Appendix  B.  In  a  field  experiment  with  real  money  at  stake,  based  on  a 
representative sample of 450 subjects, Dohmen et al. (2005) found that these survey measures 
of risk attitude are good predictors of actual risk-taking behavior.
5 
The panel estimations in this paper are based on the waves of 2002 and 2007, which 
provide the wealth information. The individual risk attitude of the same respondent in 2004 is 
used as a proxy for the risk attitude in 2002, and the risk attitude in 2006 as a proxy for 2007. 
The correlation coefficient between the risk attitudes reported in 2004 and in 2006 by the 
people in the 2007 sample is 0.48. The mean (standard deviation) changed from 4.89 (2.14) in 
2004 to 5.14 (2.08) in 2006. The data thus suggests that risk attitudes are not entirely stable 
over time. In this case the risk attitude in 2004 may be influenced by the personal situation in 
2002. This paper follows two different approaches to deal with this potential endogeneity: 
First, instrumental variables estimation, and second, using the wave of 2007 only, with the 
risk attitude in 2006 as explanatory variable for the outcome in 2007 (see section 3). The 
sample is restricted to individuals at working age (between 18 and 65 years) and excludes 
farmers,  who  presumably  have  different  determinants  of  investment  because  of  the 
dominating  role  of  agricultural  subsidies  in  Germany.
6  This  leaves  10,368  observations 
without missing values in the variables used in this analysis.
7 
                                                 
5 The wave 2004 additionally included a measure of risk attitudes using lottery choices, and questions for the 
willingness to take risks in specific domains. In this paper only the question about the general willingness to take 
risks is used, as this is the only risk question repeated in 2006. Furthermore, the experiment by Dohmen et al. 
(2005) showed that this measure performs better than the lottery measure in predicting behavior. 
6 The results remain largely the same if farmers are included, although some of the standard errors increase. 
7 The results are robust with respect to observations with missing values, see footnote 10.   5 
Table 1 shows the weighted mean values of the different asset and dept categories given 
in the German data in euro, separately for entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs and for the 
years 2002 and 2007. Entrepreneurs are defined here as individuals with a positive amount of 
private business equity.
8 All asset values and incomes are deflated to prices of 2002 using the 
consumer price index provided by the Federal Statistical Office throughout the analysis. Note 
that this comparison of assets exaggerates the wealth difference between entrepreneurs and 
the remaining population as it does not consider the statutory pension insurance entitlements 
of the dependently employed in Germany. The high portfolio share of private business equity, 
which  gives  rise  to  the  private  equity  premium  puzzle,  becomes  immediately  evident: 
entrepreneurs invested 48 % of their gross wealth in their own business in 2002 and 43 % in 
2007.  This  is  consistent  with  the  literature  analyzing  the  portfolio  composition  of 
entrepreneurs in the U.S.A. (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Gentry and Hubbard, 
2004; Heaton and Lucas, 2000).  
As Figure 1 shows, the data clearly suggest a positive relationship between risk attitudes 
and entrepreneurial investment. With increasing risk tolerance, the share of observations with 
a  positive  amount  of  private  business  equity  (entrepreneurs)  increases,  as  well  as  the 
unconditional portfolio share of private business equity, and the portfolio share conditional on 
being an entrepreneur. The bumps in the conditional portfolio share which deviate from a 
monotonically increasing function could easily be explained by sampling error, as the sample 
only includes 726 observations with positive business value. In the following, econometric 
techniques will be used to control for observed and unobserved factors in order to ensure that 
this is not a spurious relationship. Table A 1 in Appendix A gives the weighted means of the 
variables used in this analysis, including the risk attitudes. Entrepreneurs are more willing to 
take risks than the remainder of the population. On the 11-point scale, their average is 5.53 in 
2002  (6.18  in  2007),  in  comparison  to  the  average  4.81  (5.03)  of  nonentrepreneurs.  The 
                                                 
8 Three quarters of the entrepreneurs defined in this way also report self-employment as their primary activity.   6 
histograms in Figure A 1 illustrate the distribution of risk tolerance among entrepreneurs and 
nonentrepreneurs based on their answers in 2004 and 2006. Table A 2 provides descriptions 
of all the variables used in this analysis. 
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3  Empirical Methodology 
To estimate the effect of individual risk attitudes on entrepreneurial investment, the share of 
private business equity in the asset portfolio of person i at time t is modeled as a stochastic 
function of a measure of risk tolerance riskit and a vector of control variables xit. Most people 
do not hold any private business equity in their portfolio. Only 7.05 % (6.95 %) of the people 
in the sample from 2002 (2007) reported positive values. The observed portfolio share of 
private business equity sit is thus censored at 0. Additionally it is censored at 1, which is 
reached if somebody invests her entire portfolio in her private business, although this case is 
far less relevant in the data (32 observations in the pooled sample). Let the latent variable sit* 
denote the notional desired share of private business equity in person i’s portfolio at time t: 
sit* = g riskit + xit´b + ni + eit,  (3)   7 
where ni is an unobserved random effect, and eit is the error term. The observed portfolio 
share sit is expressed as 
sit = sit*  if sit* Î (0..1) 
sit = 0  if sit* £ 0   
sit = 1  if sit* ³ 1.   
Under the assumptions that ni is i.i.d., N(0, sn
2), and eit is i.i.d., N(0, se
2), independently of ni, 
the model is specified as a random effects two-limit tobit model (cf. Wooldridge, 2002). 
The vector xit controls for factors which may influence entrepreneurial investment and 
which may be correlated with risk aversion. The personal financial situation is accounted for 
by the variables net worth (gross wealth minus mortgage and other debt, in €100,000) and its 
square, gross labor income (in €1,000), and the individual average income tax rate (ATR). 







net after tax income
ATR
gross beforetax income
= - .  (4) 
As both income concepts are asked for in the SOEP questionnaire at the household level, this 
approach takes into account that married couples are taxed jointly with full income splitting in 
Germany. To control for the life cycle and experience, xit includes age (in years), prior work 
experience (in decades) and prior unemployment experience (in years) and the corresponding 
square terms. Prior work and unemployment experience are calculated using the full panel, 
which started in 1984 and was extended several times thereafter, and retrospective biography 
information informing about the time before people entered the panel. The employment status 
in  the  year  of  observation  is  excluded  from  this  calculation  to  avoid  endogeneity. 
Furthermore, dummy variables indicating educational attainment, gender, region, disability, 
German nationality, a self-employed father,
9 and marital status are included, plus the number 
                                                 
9 In Germany, self-employed mothers were rare in the generation of most respondents’ parents, and information 
on the mother’s job position is often missing in the data, so only self-employed fathers are used.   8 
of children under 17 in the household, 11 industry dummies, and a constant. A time dummy 
for 2007 accounts for potential business cycle effects. 
The following will discuss the model assumptions of this baseline specification which 
may be critical for the results. Alternative econometric models will be employed additionally 
to assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to these assumptions. 
First, the risk attitude measured on the scale from 0 to 10 may have a nonlinear effect on 
entrepreneurial investment. Thus, the risk measure riskit will be replaced by a vector of 11 
dummy variables in an alternative specification, allowing for maximal flexibility.  
Second, if individual risk attitudes are not constant (as commonly assumed), but change 
over time – to a certain degree the data actually suggest this, as mentioned in section 2 –, they 
may be endogenous with entrepreneurial investment. Endogeneity may arise if important life 
events such as the failure of a proprietary business have an impact on risk attitudes. The first 
approach  to  deal  with  this  potential  problem  is  to  use  the  body  height  and  the  mother’s 
secondary schooling level as instrumental variables (IV) for the risk attitude. The mother’s 
schooling level is measured by  a dummy  indicating if she obtained the higher secondary 
school degree Abitur, which qualifies for university admission in Germany. Dohmen et al. 
(2005) found a strong positive partial correlation between these two variables and the risk 
attitude even after controlling for other characteristics. The education level of the father had a 
much  weaker  influence.  These  correlations  are  confirmed  on  the  sample  used  here.  As 
children and the elderly are excluded from the sample, body height is clearly exogenous, and 
should not have a direct influence on entrepreneurial investment. The mother’s secondary 
schooling level is also fixed over the observation time and should not directly influence the 
adult  offspring’s  portfolio  allocation  decision  (the  test  of  oberidentifying  restrictions  is 
passed, see below). The second approach to solve the potential endogeneity problem is to use 
the risk attitude observed in 2006 to explain private business equity observed in 2007 only, 
not using the wave 2002. This of course rules out panel estimators, as this leaves only a single   9 
observation of the asset portfolio per person in the cross section of 2007. An additional IV 
tobit estimation addresses the possibility that the risk attitude may still be endogenous with 
the  private  equity  portfolio  share  due  to  events  in  the  further  past  or  unobserved  factors 
influencing both variables, such as entrepreneurial ability. 
Third, the  control variables net worth, labor income, and ATR, may be problematic. 
Measurement error in the value of private equity would change both sit on the left hand side 
and net worth on the right hand side of equation (3) in the same direction, as private equity is 
used to calculate both quantities. Thus, such measurement error would bias the coefficient of 
net  worth  upward,  in  contrast  to  the  usual  downward  attenuation  bias  introduced  by 
measurement error. Labor income may be endogenous, as a higher portfolio share of private 
business equity may generate higher income from self-employment, although the portfolio 
share not only depends  on the amount invested in the business, but also on the leverage 
decision. Given the focus of this paper, the potential endogeneity of these control variables 
would be relevant if they introduced bias in the coefficient of the variable measuring the risk 
attitude riskit. The model will thus be re-estimated omitting net worth, labor income, and the 
individual  ATR  (because  of  its  correlation  with  labor  income)  to  see  if  this  changes  the 
coefficients of riskit. 
Fourth, the tobit model is potentially sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity of the 
error term eit. This assumption is relaxed in an alternative tobit model with heteroskedastic 
errors. Here, the variance is specified flexibly as 
2 2
, exp( ´ )
h
it it x e e s s a = ,  (5) 
where x
h
it equals xit excluding the constant.  
Fifth,  the  tobit  specification  implies  that  the  ownership  and  portfolio  decisions  are 
determined  by  the  same  parameters.  Intuitively  it  seams  reasonable  that  personal  factors 
which increase the probability of a positive amount of private equity also increase its expected 
conditional  portfolio  share.  Poterba  and  Samwick  (2002)  used  the  tobit  specification  to   10 
estimate a portfolio choice model of various financial assets (not including private business 
equity). They tested and did not reject the tobit specification; the same result applies to this 
application  (see  below).  A  more  general  alternative  to  the  tobit  model  is  a  model  with 
selection, which allows the determinants of ownership to differ from the determinants of the 
conditional  portfolio  share.  This  approach  was  taken  by  King  and  Leape  (1998),  who 
estimated the asset portfolio composition of US households (again excluding private business 
equity because of data limitations). The decision to hold private business equity, or of being 
an entrepreneur in this sense, is modeled in a selection equation 
zit* = k riskit + xit´d + uit.  (6) 
The latent variable model of the portfolio share of private business equity is now specified as 
sit* = q  riskit + x
p
it´p + wit,  (7) 
and the observed portfolio share is 
sit = sit*  if zit* > 0 
sit = 0  if zit* £ 0.    
The error terms wit and uit are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution with zero 
means and correlation r. This model with selection (Heckman, 1979) is estimated using the 
FIML estimator. Censoring at 1, which occurs very seldom as mentioned above, is neglected 
in  this  specification.  For  better  identification  of  the  selection  effect,  the  dummy  variable 
indicating a self-employed father is used as an exclusion restriction not entering x
p
it in the 
portfolio equation (7), which is otherwise equal to xit. A self-employed father is likely to 
influence the probability of being an entrepreneur (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000), but is not 
expected  to  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  leverage  and  portfolio  allocation  decisions  after 
controlling for the other factors. 
In comparison to the tobit specification, this model with selection has the advantage of 
being more general. The disadvantage is that the number of parameters to be estimated almost 
doubles,  so  they  cannot  be  estimated  as  precisely.  Again,  the  model  will  additionally  be   11 
estimated using the two instrumental variables for the risk attitude in equation (7). Moreover, 
in this model equation (7) can be estimated with fixed effects. This is an alternative method of 
controlling  for  unobserved  time-invariant  individual  characteristics  which  may  both  be 
correlated  with  the  risk  attitude  and  entrepreneurial  investment,  such  as  entrepreneurial 
ability.  The  fixed  effects  estimation  does  not  require  the  assumption  that  the  unobserved 
individual effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, which is necessary for the 
random  effects  estimation  of  equation  (3),  and  may  thus  be  regarded  more  robust.  The 
estimation results based on the models with selection will be presented as a robustness check 
in section 4.3. Table 2 summarizes all the alternative specifications employed. 
4  Estimation Results 
4.1  Results from the Tobit Models 
Table 3 shows the estimated tobit coefficients for equation (3), using both data waves of 2002 
and  2007,  under  five  alternative  specifications  discussed  in  section  3.  The  positive  and 
significant  coefficients  of  the  risk  attitude  variables  indicate  that  a  higher  risk  tolerance 
increases the portfolio share of private business equity in the personal asset portfolio. In four 
specifications, the risk attitude riskit enters the equation linearly (variable risk tolerance). The 
estimation result of  ˆ g  = 0.0502 from the baseline specification, RE Tobit (1), falls into the 
95-% confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients in models RE Tobit (2) and Heter. 
Tobit (5). Excluding net worth, gross labor income and the ATR from model RE Tobit (2) 
somewhat increases the point estimate for the coefficient of risk tolerance.
10 In the model 
with multiplicative heteroscedasticity, Heter. Tobit (5), all explanatory variables in xit were 
                                                 
10 The estimated coefficient of the risk attitude also remains similar if net worth is represented by 6 interval 
dummies instead of the level and the square. The variables net worth, gross income, and the ATR, are the ones 
which  most  often  suffer  from  item  non-response.  Excluding  these  variables,  it  was  possible  to  additionally 
estimate model RE Tobit (2) on a larger sample of 14,834 observations. The results are very similar, suggesting 
that the coefficient of risk tolerance is not sensitive to selection on missing information. All results not reported 
in the tables are available from the author upon request.   12 
included to specify the heteroscedasticity, but only the significant variables are shown for 
brevity. In line with the presence of significant variables in the heteroscedasticity equation, 
homoscedasticity  is  rejected  by  an  LM  test.  The  estimated  coefficient  of  risk  tolerance 
changes only slightly in the model allowing for heteroscedasticity, however, so it is robust to 
the neglect of heteroscedasticity. 
In  the  IV  estimation,  IV  Tobit  (4),  the  coefficient  of  interest  remains  positive  and 
significant.
11 The point estimate is almost 10 times larger than in the baseline estimation, and 
the standard error is even 30 times larger. The higher point estimate in the IV estimation 
indicates  that  the  coefficient  of  risk  tolerance  may  be  biased  downwards  in  the  baseline 
estimation. One reason may be that measurement error in the risk attitude leads to downward 
attenuation  bias  in  the  baseline  estimation.  IV  estimation  reduces  the  noise,  particularly 
because body height can be measured with more precision. As the standard error in the IV 
estimation becomes very large, the coefficient of risk tolerance is imprecisely estimated, and 
the coefficient in the baseline estimation is still included in its 90-% confidence interval. 
Despite the low precision, the larger point estimate reinforces the finding that risk tolerance 
has a positive and significant effect on the portfolio share of private business equity. The 
result  alleviates  possible  concerns  that  risk  attitudes  might  be  positively  correlated  with 
unobserved  entrepreneurial  ability,  which  in  turn  might  be  positively  correlated  with  the 
portfolio  share  of  private  business  equity.  This  would  result  in  a  lower  point  estimate 
emerging  from  IV  estimation.  The  instrumental  variables  height  and  motherhighersec  are 
jointly significant at the 1 % level (Wald c2
2 = 20.46) in the “first stage” regression of risk 
tolerance on the instrument set, which additionally includes all explanatory variables in xit. 
The coefficients of height and motherhighersec reported in the table are estimated jointly with 
                                                 
11 410 observations provide no information about their body height or their mother’s education level and have to 
be excluded  from  the IV  models. The results are similar if the  mother’s education is not used and the IV 
estimation  relies  solely  on  the  body  height,  although  this  instrument  alone  is  weaker.  In  this  case,  only  7 
observations have to be excluded.   13 
the tobit coefficients in the FIML estimation. The test of overidentifying restrictions is not 
rejected at the 10 % level. A Wald test rejects exogeneity of the risk attitude at the 10 % level, 
but not at the 5 % level. The fact, that exogeneity is not rejected very strongly, increases 
confidence in the baseline estimation. 
In specification RE Tobit (3), riskit is represented by 10 dummy variables, which allows 
for arbitrary nonlinear effects. The omitted base category is risk0, which indicates the highest 
risk aversion on the 11-point scale. A slightly higher risk tolerance indicated by risk1 and 
risk2 has a positive influence on the portfolio share in comparison to the base category, but 
the difference is not yet significant. The point estimates of the coefficients of the dummy 
variables risk3 to risk10 are significant and increase monotonically with higher risk tolerance. 
This result strongly supports the hypothesized positive relationship between risk tolerance and 
entrepreneurial investment. 
In the three RE tobit models, the point estimates for the standard error of the unobserved 
random effect sn are positive, and sn = 0 is rejected by a likelihood ratio test at the 1 % level. 
Although the efficiency of the models is improved by controlling for random effects, the 
coefficient of risk tolerance in the baseline model is robust to omitting the random effect, as 
indicated by the results from model Heter. Tobit (5) without random effects. 
The results from estimating the models on the 2007 data only are shown in Table 4. As 
discussed in section 3, using only the wave of 2007 and the lagged risk attitude reported in 
2006 may avoid possible endogeneity. In comparison to the estimations based on both waves 
of 2002 and 2007, the standard errors increase due to the smaller sample size. In the tobit 
models  (6),  which  corresponds  to  the  baseline  specification,  (7)  with  the  reduced  set  of 
explanatory variables, and (10) with heteroscedasticity, the point estimates for the coefficient   14 
of risk tolerance  are larger than in the  estimations based on the  full sample.
12 The point 
estimate in the baseline model RE Tobit (1) estimated on the full sample,  ˆ g  = 0.0502, is still 
included in the corresponding 95-% confidence intervals in models (6) and (10), but not in 
model (7). The higher point estimates may indicate that endogeneity of the risk attitude in the 
estimations  based  on  the  full  sample  biases  the  estimated  coefficient  of  risk  tolerance 
downwards. This may arise, for example, if a declining market value of a private business 
increases the risk tolerance of the entrepreneur. In this case, negative shocks in the observed 
portfolio share of private business equity in 2002 may be associated with positive shocks in 
the risk tolerance observed in 2004, which would result in a downward bias of the coefficient. 
This interpretation is in line with prospect theory, which predicts that entrepreneurs who have 
lost on their business are willing to take high risks in order to get a chance to offset the loss. 
In any case, the higher point estimates in the models based on the 2007 sample reassure that 
risk tolerance has a positive influence on entrepreneurial investment, and the lower point 
estimates in the models based on the full sample are the more conservative estimates. 
The results from the specification with dummy variables for the risk attitude, Tobit (8), 
are similar to the results based on the full sample, although the coefficients are less precisely 
estimated due to the smaller sample size. The point estimates of the coefficients of risk9 and 
risk10 become larger, in line with the findings reported above, but the point estimates based 
on the full sample remain within the 95-% confidence intervals. 
The coefficient of risk tolerance in the IV estimation (9) is estimated to be much larger 
than in the models without IV, which replicates the findings based on the full sample. The 
standard error becomes so large due to the small sample size that the coefficient is not even 
significantly different from 0, however. The coefficients of height and motherhighersec in a 
regression of risk tolerance on the instrument set are still jointly highly significant (Wald c2
2 
                                                 
12 The heteroscedasticity equation (5) used in model Heter. Tobit (5) was first estimated with all variables in xit. 
Then the estimation was repeated including only the 4 variables in the heteroscedasticity equation, which turned 
out to be significant. This reduced the standard errors of the tobit coefficients.   15 
= 12.41). Exogeneity of the risk attitude is not rejected by the Wald test here (p-value = 
0.352). This supports the idea that limiting the sample to the wave of 2007 and using the 
lagged risk attitude avoids the endogeneity problem, and confirms the validity of the models 
without IV in the limited sample. 
Many of the control variables, which are reported completely in Table 3 and in part in 
Table 4, are found to significantly influence the portfolio share of private business equity. Net 
worth  has  a  positive  effect  at  slightly  diminishing  rates.  This  may  be  interpreted  as  an 
indication for the presence of liquidity constraints in the sense of Evans and Jovanovic (1989), 
and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), although Hurst and Lusardi (2004) casted doubt on this 
explanation.  The  positive  effect  of  net  worth  on  entrepreneurial  investment  found  in  this 
analysis would then suggests that less wealthy people who would like to start up a business 
face constraints due to imperfect financial markets, and that less wealthy entrepreneurs are 
similarly constrained if they want to reduce the portfolio share of their business by taking on 
debt. In this case, capital constraints may be an additional explanation for the private business 
equity premium puzzle, besides the role played by heterogeneous risk attitudes. 
Both gross labor income and the ATR are found to have a positive influence on the 
portfolio share. The positive effect of the ATR is in line with the theoretical predictions and 
empirical results of Cullen and Gordon (2007). One mechanism through which higher income 
taxes may encourage entrepreneurship is the implied sharing of risk with the government (see 
also Fossen, 2007). Better tax avoidance and evasion opportunities for the self-employed in 
comparison to the dependently employed may also make entrepreneurship more attractive in 
the presence of higher taxes, although the empirical evidence is mixed (Parker, 1996 and 
2003). In any case, the coefficient of risk tolerance is not sensitive to the exclusion of the 
variables related to net worth and income, as mentioned above. Furthermore, entrepreneurial 
investment is lower for women and higher for older people, which confirms results from the   16 
literature (Wagner, 2007, investigated the gender effect). As expected, a self-employed father 
also has a positive influence. 
4.2  Effects on the Ownership Probability and Portfolio Share of Private Equity 
The effect of risk attitudes on entrepreneurial investment is twofold. First, they influence the 
probability of owning private business equity, which can be interpreted as the decision to be 
an  entrepreneur.  Second,  they  influence  the  share  of  private  business  equity  in  the  asset 
portfolio, conditional on owning private equity. The size of both effects can be calculated 
using the estimated tobit models. The marginal effects of the measure of risk tolerance riskit 
on the probability of owning private business equity,  ( ) Prob 0 , it it it it s risk x risk ¶ > ¶ , and the 
marginal  effect  on  the  portfolio  share  conditional  on  owning  private  equity, 
( ) E 0, , it it it it it s s risk x risk ¶ > ¶ , are evaluated at the mean values of riskit and xit, and given a 
zero random effect. The standard errors are calculated using the delta method. 
Table  5  shows  the  estimated  marginal  effects  of  risk  tolerance  on  the  probability  of 
ownership and the conditional portfolio share of private equity, which are estimated based on 
the different specifications and samples. The baseline model RE Tobit (1) yields the smallest 
and thus most conservative point estimates of both effects, except for a smaller effect on the 
probability of ownership based on model Heter. Tobit (5). In the baseline model, an increase 
of the risk tolerance by one point on the 11-point scale increases the probability of holding 
private  business  equity  by  0.65  percentage  points.  Given  that  the  expected  probability  of 
owning  private  equity  is  4.72 %  at  the  mean  values  of  the  explanatory  variables,  this 
corresponds to a relative increase of 13.8 %. The portfolio share of private equity, conditional 
on owning a positive amount, increases by 0.48 percentage points if the risk tolerance grows 
by  one  point  on  the  11-point  scale.  The  expected  conditional  portfolio  share  of  private 
business equity is 28.56 %, again evaluated at mean x, so the relative increase is 1.68 %. 
Thus, the estimated relative effect of risk attitudes on the decision to be an entrepreneur is   17 
much higher than the relative effect on the conditional portfolio share of private business 
equity. 
The  estimated  marginal  effects  based  on  the  different  tobit  specifications  are  all 
significantly positive at the 5 % level, except for the effects estimated using model IV Tobit 
(9) on the 2007 data. The estimated marginal effects in the baseline estimation RE Tobit (1) 
reported above lie within the 90-% confidence intervals of the estimated effects in the other 
models, except for model Tobit (7), which yields larger marginal effects. 
Table 6 presents the estimated effects of the dummy variables capturing the risk attitude 
riskit alternatively to the linear variable. These are the effects of discrete changes of one of the 
risk dummy variables from 0 to 1, evaluated at a value of 0 for the other risk dummies, and at 
the mean values of the other explanatory variables. In model RE Tobit (3), the estimated 
effects,  both  on  the  ownership  probability  and  on  the  conditional  portfolio  share,  grow 
monotonically with increasing risk tolerance, starting from risk3. The effects of the low levels 
of risk tolerance risk1 and risk2 are not significantly different from the effect of the base 
category risk0 (highest risk aversion). There are remarkably stronger effects for the most risk 
tolerant people. Those indicating the highest level of risk tolerance, risk10, have an 11.28 
percentage-points higher probability of owning private business equity than those in the base 
category with the lowest level of risk tolerance. Thus, they are 8 times more likely to be 
entrepreneurs  than  the  most  risk  averse,  whose  expected  probability  is  only  1.37 %.  The 
conditional portfolio share of private business equity of the most risk tolerant entrepreneurs is 
7.83 percentage points larger than the portfolio share of the most risk-averse entrepreneurs. 
As the conditional portfolio share of the latter is predicted to be 24.90 %, this corresponds to a 
relative effect of 31.45 %. In model Tobit (8), which is estimated using the wave of 2007 
only, the estimated effects are even stronger. The point estimates from model RE Tobit (3) lie 
within the 95-% confidence intervals, however.   18 
4.3  Robustness Check: Results from the Selection Models 
Table  A  3  in  Appendix  A  shows  the  estimated  coefficients  for  different  variants  of  the 
portfolio share model with selection, as described by equation (7), based on the full sample of 
2002 and 2007. The coefficient of risk tolerance is positive in the four models including this 
variable, indicating that higher risk tolerance increases the portfolio share of private business 
equity,  but  it  is  not  statistically  significant  in  these  models  with  selection.  Here,  the 
identification of the influence of risk attitudes on the portfolio share must rely solely on those 
observations  with  positive  holdings  of  private  business  equity.  As  the  number  of  these 
observations is low, the standard errors are large. It turns out that the correlation between the 
error terms in the selection equation (6) and the portfolio share equation (7) is not statistically 
significant. The hypothesis that r = 0 is not rejected by Wald tests in the FIML models (11), 
(12), and (13), with p-value = 0.71 and larger, and the inverse Mill’s ratio is insignificant in 
the two-step models (14) and (15). 
The estimated marginal effects of risk tolerance on the conditional portfolio share of 
private  business  equity,  ( ) E * 0, , it it it it it s z risk x risk ¶ > ¶ ,  are  reported  on  the  right  side  of 
Table 5 and can be compared directly to the conditional marginal effects based on the tobit 
models.
13 The conditional marginal effects based on the model including the net worth and 
income related variables (11) and the model excluding these variables (12) are larger than the 
one based on model RE Tobit (1), although the latter still lies within their 95-% confidence 
intervals. 
In the IV estimation with selection, IV Heckit (14), both the coefficient of risk tolerance 
and its standard error (as well as the conditional marginal effect) become substantially larger, 
similarly  to  the  findings  based  on  the  IV  tobit  models.  The  large  point  estimate  of  the 
                                                 
13 The conditional marginal effects in the FIML models (11), (12), and (13), are calculated as in Greene (2008), 
page 885. In the two-step models (14) and (15), the point estimators of the coefficients are directly taken as 
estimates for the conditional marginal effects, as the inverse Mill’s ratio is insignificant.   19 
coefficient again indicates that the estimations without IV may be downward biased. The 
large standard error is due to the inefficiency of the IV method. 
In the fixed effects estimation with selection, FE Heckit (15), the point estimate for the 
coefficient  of  risk  tolerance  is  3.7  times  larger  than  in  model  Heckit  (11)  without  fixed 
effects. As the standard error is also larger, the coefficient is still not significantly different 
from zero. The coefficient is imprecisely estimated, because using the fixed effects method, 
the coefficient of risk tolerance is identified solely based on those individuals whose risk 
attitude  changes  between  the  two  observation  years,  i.e.  for  individuals  who  reported  a 
different risk attitude in 2006 than in 2004. The hypothesis that all fixed effects equal 0 is 
rejected by an F-test (F = 3.59). The larger point estimate for the coefficient of risk tolerance 
suggests that without controlling for fixed effects, the coefficient may be biased downwards. 
This is consistent with the results from the IV estimations. If risk tolerance were correlated 
with  time-invariant  unobserved  characteristics  such  as  entrepreneurial  ability,  and  these 
characteristics had a positive influence on entrepreneurial investment, the coefficient of risk 
tolerance would become smaller in the fixed effects model. 
Using  dummy  variables  to  describe  the  risk  attitude  in  model  Heckit  (13),  all 
corresponding coefficients except for risk1 are positive and significant.
14 The coefficient and 
also the effect on the conditional portfolio share (reported in Table 6)  are largest for the 
highest level of risk tolerance, risk10. The levels of risk tolerance indicated by risk3 to risk5 
have a larger effect on the conditional portfolio share in this specification than risk6 to risk9. 
Apart from risk3 to risk5, the effect is still increasing with higher risk tolerance. Given the 
standard errors, the hypothesis of a monotonically increasing function of the risk tolerance 
cannot be rejected. At all levels of risk tolerance other than the base category, which indicates 
                                                 
14 The number of observations in the 11 different risk classes becomes small in the second step of the model with 
selection, which is based on entrepreneurs only. To increase the number of observations, in model Heckit (13) 
mean values are imputed for observations which have missing values in gross labor income or the ATR. This is 
not deemed critical, as the coefficients of these variables are insignificant in all the models reported in Table A 3.   20 
complete unwillingness to take risks, the estimated effect on the conditional portfolio share is 
higher than in the tobit specifications, which thus remain the more conservative estimates. 
Table A 4 presents the estimated coefficients of variants of the probit selection equation 
(6), which describes the probability of owning private business equity. Here the coefficients 
of  risk  tolerance  are  not  only  positive,  but  also  statistically  significant.  The  coefficients 
reported under the column title Probit (11) in Table A 4 and under Heckit (11) in Table A 3 
are estimated jointly using the FIML estimator. The same applies to Probit (12) and Heckit 
(12), as well as Probit (13) and Heckit (13). In contrast, the models IV Heckit (14) and FE 
Heckit (15) are estimated using two-step procedures. The estimated coefficients in the first 
step probit equation are very similar to those reported under Probit (11) and therefore not 
shown. The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable indicating a self-employed father, 
which is excluded from the portfolio equation, is positive and significant at the 1 % level in 
the selection equations, with t-values 2.92 in model (11), 5.89 in (12), 3.79 in (13), and 2.99 
in (14). 
Additionally, results of a probit estimation with height and motherhighersec as IVs for 
risk tolerance are presented under IV Probit (16). The IV estimation yields a substantially 
larger probit coefficient, which remains significant despite its increased standard error. This 
points to a possible downward bias of the probit coefficients without IV and is consistent with 
the result from model IV Tobit (4). 
The estimated marginal effects of the risk attitude on the probability of ownership of 
private  business  equity  based  on  the  probit  models,  ( ) Prob 0 , it it it it s risk x risk ¶ > ¶ ,  are 
presented in the first column of Table 5, models (11) to (15). The effects on the ownership 
probability are positive and significant and larger than the effect obtained from the baseline 
model RE Tobit (1), although the latter is still included in the 95-% confidence intervals 
except for model (12). In summary, the results from the models with selection show that the 
effects of risk tolerance both on the ownership probability and on the conditional portfolio   21 
share of private business equity based on the baseline model RE Tobit (1) are unlikely to be 
overestimated and may rather be underestimated.
15 
The more general model with selection can be used to assess the validity of the tobit 
specification. If the tobit specification is correct, the estimated ratio of the tobit coefficients 
over the standard error of the error term should not be statistically different from the estimated 
probit coefficients on the same variables. The test is conducted using the estimation results 
from model Tobit (6), which is based on the wave of 2007. An additional test uses a tobit 
estimation based on the pooled sample of 2002 and 2007 as in the baseline estimation, model 
RE Tobit (1), but without the random effects, as the random effects tobit model is not directly 
comparable to the probit model. It turns out that the ratios based on the tobit models indeed lie 
within the 95-% confidence intervals of the corresponding coefficients in the probit models 
for all the explanatory variables except for net worth and its square. The coefficients of net 
worth and its square also pass the test based on model Tobit (6) if the confidence intervals for 
the probit coefficients are calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. In any 
case,  the  signs  of  these  coefficients  are  the  same  in  the  tobit  and  probit  models.  As  the 
coefficient of risk tolerance is not sensitive to the exclusion of the net worth variables (see 
above), in summary the tobit model seems to be appropriate for the purpose of this study.
16 
A further robustness check was conducted regarding public start-up subsidies for the 
unemployed. A dummy variable indicating if an entrepreneur started up her business during 
the previous year with the help of a public subsidy known as “Ich-AG” (“Me-Incorporation”) 
was included in the vector of control variables x
p
it in the otherwise identical models with 
                                                 
15 The estimated effects on the ownership probability based on the dummy variables probit model, which are 
shown on the left side of Table 6, under the column heading Heckit (13), increase monotonically with increasing 
risk tolerance and are significant starting from risk3. The effects based on model RE Tobit (3) lie within the 
95-% confidence intervals except for the medium range of risk4-risk7, which are estimated smaller using model 
Heckit (13). Taken together, the results from the dummy variable models suggest that a medium range of risk 
tolerance has smaller positive effects on the probability of private equity ownership than on the conditional 
portfolio  share,  a  detail  that  the  tobit  models  cannot  identify  by  assumption.  This  finding  should  not  be 
overemphasized because of the large standard errors involved, however. The results persist if the categories risk0 
and risk1 are joined together to form a broader base category. 
16 Poterba and Samwick (2002) actually only conduct this test for the coefficient of interest and ignore the other 
explanatory variables.   22 
selection reported in Table A 3. The program was available from January 2003 to August 
2006, so it is only potentially relevant for entrepreneurs observed in 2007 who started their 
business  before  August  2006.  The  coefficient  of  the  subsidy  variable  turned  out  to  be 
insignificant in all the models, so it could be dropped from the final specifications. The data 
give insufficient information about the bridging-allowance (Überbrückungsgeld), which was 
also available till August 2006, and the new start-up subsidy programme which replaced the 
two programs (Gründungszuschuss). As the popular Me-Incorporation program is not found 
to have a significant impact, it is likely that these programs do not significantly affect the 
coefficient  of  interest  either.  Baumgartner  and  Caliendo  (2008)  provide  a  description  and 
evaluation of the older two German start-up subsidy programs. 
5  Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that people with lower levels of risk aversion are more likely to 
invest in an own entrepreneurial firm, and less risk averse entrepreneurs invest a larger share 
of  their  asset  portfolio  in  their  own  business.  This  finding  is  robust  to  a  variety  of 
specifications,  which  control  for  observed  and  unobserved  characteristics  and  potential 
endogeneity of the risk attitude. The most risk tolerant individuals have an 8 times higher 
probability of owning private business equity than the most risk averse individuals, and the 
portfolio share of the most risk tolerant entrepreneurs is 31.5 % larger than that of the most 
risk averse entrepreneurs. 
The results contribute to explaining the private equity premium puzzle. This puzzle arises 
from the observation that entrepreneurs invest a large share of their wealth in their own firms, 
despite  the  high  risk  associated  with  such  an  undiversified  portfolio,  and  without  being 
compensated for by a risk premium that would seem adequate for a population average level 
of risk aversion. The evidence found in this paper suggests that the observed undiversified 
portfolio structures of entrepreneurs result at least in part from self-selection of risk tolerant   23 
people into entrepreneurship. While this hypothesis has been stated in the literature, this paper 
provides the first empirical evidence on the positive relationship between risk tolerance and 
entrepreneurial investment. 
Heterogeneous  risk  attitudes  compete  with  credit  constraints  as  another  possible 
explanation for the private equity premium puzzle.  In the presence of  imperfect  financial 
markets, entrepreneurs may want to diversify their portfolio by taking on debt, but external 
financing  may  be  costly  due  to  asymmetric  information.  This  would  call  for  government 
intervention in the financial markets, e.g. through subsidized venture capital. In contrast, if 
heterogeneous  risk  attitudes  explain  the  observed  undiversified  portfolio  structures  of 
entrepreneurs, they may result from unconstraint individual optimization, and no government 
intervention is needed. While the results from this paper do not rule out that credit constraints 
may be at work as well, finding evidence that heterogeneous risk attitudes explain at least an 
important  part  of  the  puzzle  certainly  puts  the  case  for  government  intervention  into 
perspective.   24 
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Tables 
Table 1: Weighted Mean Asset Holdings and Portfolio Shares 
  Entrepreneurs 
2002    2007    Asset category 
Mean  Share of gross wealth  Mean  Share of gross wealth 
Private business equity  274,707  0.480  207,401  0.429 
Owner-occupied housing  101,964  0.178  95,222  0.197 
Other property  126,121  0.220  109,890  0.227 
Financial assets  25,482  0.045  38,572  0.080 
Life and private pension insurance  39,658  0.069  31,013  0.064 
Tangible assets  4,638  0.008  1,871  0.004 
Gross wealth  572,570  1.000  483,970  1.000 
Mortgage on owner-occ. housing  25,153  0.044  24,127  0.050 
Mortgage on other property  43,948  0.077  35,265  0.073 
Other liabilities  17,529  0.031  21,673  0.045 
Net worth  485,941  0.849  402,905  0.832 
N  371    355   
  Others 
2002    2007    Asset category 
Mean  Share of gross wealth  Mean  Share of gross wealth 
Private business equity  0  0.000  0  0.000 
Owner-occupied housing  64,811  0.605  60,961  0.582 
Other property  14,976  0.140  19,403  0.185 
Financial assets  11,924  0.111  12,633  0.121 
Life and private pension insurance  14,305  0.134  11,007  0.105 
Tangible assets  1,060  0.010  689  0.007 
Gross wealth  107,076  1.000  104,692  1.000 
Mortgage on owner-occ. housing  17,221  0.161  16,527  0.158 
Mortgage on other property  5,264  0.049  5,960  0.057 
Other liabilities  2,692  0.025  2,447  0.023 
Net worth  81,900  0.765  79,758  0.762 
N  4,888    4,754   
The  means  are  given  in  euro  deflated  to  prices  of  2002.  Source:  Own  calculations  based  on  the  SOEP 
(2002/2007). 
Table 2: Short Descriptions of Alternative Empirical Specifications 
Spec. Name  Data  Short Description 
RE Tobit (1)  02/07  Random effects 2-limit Tobit (baseline specification) 
RE Tobit (2)  02/07  Random effects 2-limit Tobit, excluding net worth, gross income, and ATR 
RE Tobit (3)  02/07  Random effects 2-limit Tobit, risk attitude captured by dummy variables 
IV Tobit (4)  02/07  2-limit IV Tobit with height as IV for risk tolerance 
Heter. Tobit (5)  02/07  2-limit Tobit with multiplicative heteroscedasticity 
Tobit (6)  07  2-limit Tobit 
Tobit (7)  07  2-limit Tobit, excluding net worth, gross income, and ATR  
Tobit (8)  07  2-limit Tobit, risk attitude captured by dummy variables 
IV Tobit (9)  07  2-limit IV Tobit with height as IV for risk tolerance 
Heter. Tobit (10)  07  2-limit Tobit with multiplicative heteroscedasticity 
Heckit (11)  02/07  Selection model FIML estimator 
Heckit (12)  02/07  Selection model FIML estimator, excluding net worth, gross income, and ATR 
Heckit (13)  02/07  Selection model FIML estimator, risk attitude captured by dummy variables 
IV Heckit (14)  02/07  2-step selection model, 2
nd step: IV GMM with height as IV for risk tolerance 
FE Heckit (15)  02/07  2-step selection model, 2
nd step: Fixed effects estimator   28 
Table 3: Portfolio Share of Private Equity: Estimated Tobit Coefficients (SOEP 2002/2007) 
  RE Tobit (1)  RE Tobit (2)  RE Tobit (3)  IV Tobit (4)  Heter. Tobit (5) 
risk tolerance  0.0502***  0.0569***    0.4926**  0.0510*** 
  (0.0075)  (0.0078)    (0.2229)  (0.0070) 
risk1      0.2501     
      (0.1995)     
risk2      0.2245     
      (0.1747)     
risk3      0.2962*     
      (0.1694)     
risk4      0.4154**     
      (0.1699)     
risk5      0.4223**     
      (0.1672)     
risk6      0.4253**     
      (0.1686)     
risk7      0.5075***     
      (0.1674)     
risk8      0.5148***     
      (0.1695)     
risk9      0.5913***     
      (0.1813)     
risk10      0.8160***     
      (0.1922)     
networth100k  0.0214***    0.0208***  0.0128*  0.0893*** 
  (0.0022)    (0.0022)  (0.0076)  (0.0138) 
networth100k_sq  -0.0000***    -0.0000***  -0.0000  -0.0012** 
  (0.0000)    (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0005) 
grossinc1000  0.0154***    0.0157***  0.0066  0.0170*** 
  (0.0031)    (0.0031)  (0.0095)  (0.0057) 
avgtaxrate  0.2980***    0.3038***  0.2049  0.0082 
  (0.1093)    (0.1092)  (0.1546)  (0.3804) 
d2007  -0.0146  -0.0315  -0.0172  -0.1210*  -0.0053 
  (0.0238)  (0.0239)  (0.0238)  (0.0677)  (0.0554) 
highschool  0.0776*  0.0868*  0.0773*  0.0513  0.0391 
  (0.0461)  (0.0482)  (0.0460)  (0.0501)  (0.1028) 
apprenticeship  -0.0942**  -0.1293***  -0.0926**  -0.1234**  -0.1925* 
  (0.0464)  (0.0481)  (0.0463)  (0.0515)  (0.1020) 
highertechncol  0.0503  0.0331  0.0534  -0.0893  -0.1009 
  (0.0480)  (0.0494)  (0.0478)  (0.0670)  (0.0860) 
university  -0.0064  0.0486  -0.0041  -0.1266*  -0.0690 
  (0.0497)  (0.0511)  (0.0495)  (0.0758)  (0.1196) 
female  -0.3154***  -0.3606***  -0.3163***  0.0071  -0.2391** 
  (0.0402)  (0.0424)  (0.0400)  (0.1603)  (0.1090) 
east  0.0793*  0.0404  0.0767*  0.0720  -0.1196 
  (0.0449)  (0.0467)  (0.0448)  (0.0494)  (0.1109) 
south  0.0413  0.0479  0.0423  0.0819  -0.0872 
  (0.0404)  (0.0419)  (0.0403)  (0.0520)  (0.0762) 
north  0.0603  0.0591  0.0592  0.1149*  0.0557 
  (0.0544)  (0.0564)  (0.0543)  (0.0667)  (0.1003) 
age  0.1032***  0.1118***  0.1030***  0.1693***  0.1162*** 
  (0.0200)  (0.0207)  (0.0200)  (0.0361)  (0.0248) 
age_sq  -0.0010***  -0.0010***  -0.0009***  -0.0016***  -0.0012*** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
prworkexp10  -0.2265**  -0.1883**  -0.2310**  -0.3826***  -0.1482 
  (0.0905)  (0.0937)  (0.0902)  (0.1387)  (0.2099) 
prworkexp10_sq  0.0230  0.0172  0.0239  0.0626*  0.0357 
  (0.0206)  (0.0212)  (0.0205)  (0.0338)  (0.0428) 
Table continued on the following page. 
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Table 3 continued 
  RE Tobit (1)  RE Tobit (2)  RE Tobit (3)  IV Tobit (4)  Heter. Tobit (5) 
prunempexp  0.0020  -0.0190  0.0018  -0.0443  -0.1420* 
  (0.0285)  (0.0287)  (0.0289)  (0.0345)  (0.0793) 
prunempexp_sq  0.0013  0.0027  0.0014  0.0084*  0.0102*** 
  (0.0037)  (0.0036)  (0.0039)  (0.0047)  (0.0037) 
disabled  -0.0803  -0.1111  -0.0783  -0.0631  -0.0666 
  (0.0719)  (0.0744)  (0.0717)  (0.0872)  (0.1599) 
german  0.0027  0.0308  0.0059  0.0446  0.5994* 
  (0.0894)  (0.0937)  (0.0894)  (0.1085)  (0.3125) 
nchildren  0.0294  0.0359*  0.0287  0.0363*  0.0484 
  (0.0183)  (0.0187)  (0.0183)  (0.0218)  (0.0317) 
married  -0.0614  -0.0737*  -0.0625  0.0239  -0.0332 
  (0.0381)  (0.0393)  (0.0381)  (0.0643)  (0.0829) 
fatherselfempl  0.1985***  0.2879***  0.1961***  0.1010  0.2475*** 
  (0.0501)  (0.0512)  (0.0500)  (0.0657)  (0.0724) 
11 industry dum.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
constant  -3.9648***  -4.1487***  -4.1083***  -7.5714***  -4.5745*** 
  (0.4151)  (0.4349)  (0.4426)  (1.7830)  (0.4207) 
sn  0.6669***  0.7168***  0.6641***     
  (0.0275)  (0.0290)  (0.0276)     
se  0.3436***  0.3369***  0.3428***     
  (0.0187)  (0.0188)  (0.0186)     
”First stage“ equation of risk tolerance 
height        0.0131***   
        (0.0038)   
motherhighersec        0.1488**   
        (0.0676)   
variables in x        YES   
Heteroscedasticity equation 
networth100k          0.0222*** 
          (0.0036) 
networth100k_sq          -0.0000*** 
          (0.0000) 
east          0.2267** 
          (0.0902) 
prunempexp          0.1476*** 
          (0.0568) 
prunempexp_sq          -0.0122*** 
          (0.0047) 
german          -0.5056*** 
          (0.1701) 
fatherselfempl          -0.2142** 
          (0.0869) 
insign. variables          YES 
Wald c
2        384.216  679.690 
LR c
2  598.039  439.058  606.340     
log likelihood  -2075.427  -2154.918  -2071.277  -23405.050  -2106.970 
N  10368  10368  10368  9958  10368 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. In parenthesis: standard errors in RE 
models, robust standard errors in spec. (4) and (5). Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2002/2007. 
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Table 4: Portfolio Share of Private Equity: Estimated Tobit Coefficients (SOEP 2007) 
  Tobit (6)  Tobit (7)  Tobit (8)  IV Tobit (9)  Heter. Tobit (10) 
risk tolerance  0.0698***  0.0854***    0.3997  0.0621*** 
  (0.0117)  (0.0120)    (0.3531)  (0.0113) 
risk1      0.1967     
      (0.3354)     
risk2      0.1671     
      (0.2962)     
risk3      0.2760     
      (0.2909)     
risk4      0.3897     
      (0.2929)     
risk5      0.4006     
      (0.2866)     
risk6      0.4086     
      (0.2885)     
risk7      0.5746**     
      (0.2882)     
risk8      0.5199*     
      (0.2905)     
risk9      0.7697**     
      (0.3034)     
risk10      0.9634***     
      (0.3156)     
networth100k  0.0406***    0.0404***  0.0326***  0.0668*** 
  (0.0087)    (0.0088)  (0.0101)  (0.0111) 
networth100k_sq  -0.0001***    -0.0001***  -0.0001***  -0.0002*** 
  (0.0000)    (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
grossinc1000  0.0340**    0.0337**  0.0077  0.0451*** 
  (0.0133)    (0.0133)  (0.0342)  (0.0123) 
avgtaxrate  0.2670    0.2690  0.2002  0.2023 
  (0.1963)    (0.1943)  (0.2120)  (0.1967) 
other controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
se  0.7416***  0.7875***  0.7374***     
  (0.0392)  (0.0388)  (0.0389)     
”First stage“ equation of risk tolerance 
height        0.0139**   
        (0.0060)   
motherhighersec        0.1532   
        (0.1172)   
variables in x        YES   
Heteroscedasticity equation 
networth100k          0.0278*** 
          (0.0079) 
networth100k_sq          -0.0001** 
          (0.0000) 
highertechncol          0.1574 
          (0.1125) 
german          -0.4353*** 
          (0.0667) 
Pseudo R
2  0.175  0.129  0.178     
Wald c
2        214.755  336.405 
log likelihood  -1077.975  -1138.735  -1073.877  -11419.382  -1057.481 
N  5109  5109  5109  4900  5109 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2007. 
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Table 5: Ownership Probability and Portfolio Share of Private Equity: Estimated Marginal 
Effects of Risk Tolerance 
    Probability of Ownership  Conditional Portfolio Share 
Model  Data  Marginal Effect  Standard Error  Marginal Effect  Standard Error 
RE Tobit (1)  02/07  0.0065***    0.0009  0.0048***  0.0007 
RE Tobit (2)  02/07  0.0070***  0.0009  0.0051***  0.0007 
IV Tobit (4)  02/07  0.0688**  0.0310  0.0277**  0.0125 
Heter. Tobit (5)  02/07  0.0054***  0.0009  0.0051***  0.0007 
Tobit (6)  07  0.0084***  0.0013  0.0067***  0.0010 
Tobit (7)  07  0.0099***  0.0013  0.0077***  0.0010 
IV Tobit (9)  07  0.0591  0.0521  0.0282  0.0249 
Heter. Tobit (10)  07  0.0076***  0.0013  0.0062***  0.0010 
Heckit (11)  02/07  0.0082***  0.0010  0.0058  0.0052 
Heckit (12)  02/07  0.0096***  0.0010  0.0084  0.0053 
IV Heckit (14)  02/07  0.0081***  0.0009  0.1256  0.1674 
FE Heckit (15)  02/07  see above  see above  0.0196  0.0159 
Standard  errors  are  heteroscedasticity  robust  except  for  the  random  effects  (RE)  tobit  models.  Stars 
(* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 
2002/2007. 
Table 6: Ownership Probability and Portfolio Share of Private Equity: Estimated Effects of 
Risk Attitude (Dummy Variables Model) 
  Probability of Ownership  Conditional Portfolio Share 
Model  RE Tobit (3)  Tobit (8)  Heckit (13)  RE Tobit (3)  Tobit (8)  Heckit (13) 
Data  02/07  07  02/07  02/07  07  02/07 
risk1  0.0167  0.0109  0.0047  0.0214  0.0165  0.1057 
  (0.0128)  (0.0176)  (0.0079)  (0.0168)  (0.0277)  (0.0841) 
risk2  0.0144  0.0089  0.0055  0.0191  0.0139  0.1482** 
  (0.0092)  (0.0131)  (0.0063)  (0.0143)  (0.0240)  (0.0718) 
risk3  0.0211**  0.0173  0.0103*  0.0256*  0.0236  0.2111*** 
  (0.0088)  (0.0132)  (0.0063)  (0.0139)  (0.0235)  (0.0707) 
risk4  0.0349***  0.0289**  0.0138**  0.0368***  0.0341  0.2564*** 
  (0.0096)  (0.0142)  (0.0064)  (0.0139)  (0.0237)  (0.0720) 
risk5  0.0358***  0.0302**  0.0191***  0.0374***  0.0352  0.2257*** 
  (0.0087)  (0.0129)  (0.0061)  (0.0136)  (0.0230)  (0.0648) 
risk6  0.0362***  0.0311**  0.0220***  0.0377***  0.0359  0.1697** 
  (0.0091)  (0.0134)  (0.0066)  (0.0138)  (0.0232)  (0.0667) 
risk7  0.0482***  0.0553***  0.0346***  0.0458***  0.0524**  0.1839*** 
  (0.0092)  (0.0142)  (0.0069)  (0.0137)  (0.0231)  (0.0665) 
risk8  0.0494***  0.0464***  0.0360***  0.0465***  0.0468**  0.1858*** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0149)  (0.0076)  (0.0139)  (0.0234)  (0.0667) 
risk9  0.0626***  0.0951***  0.0577***  0.0543***  0.0731***  0.1919** 
  (0.0160)  (0.0273)  (0.0147)  (0.0154)  (0.0252)  (0.0749) 
risk10  0.1128***  0.1479***  0.1338***  0.0783***  0.0951***  0.3603*** 
  (0.0270)  (0.0426)  (0.0316)  (0.0173)  (0.0273)  (0.0791) 
Effects of a discrete change of the dummy variables from 0 to 1. Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 
10% / 5% / 1% level. In parenthesis: standard errors in the RE tobit model (3), robust standard errors otherwise. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2002/2007. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Tables and Figure 
Table A 1: Weighted Means of Variables 
  2002 (risk attitude reported in 2004)  2007 (risk attitude reported in 2006) 
Variable (unit)  Entrepreneurs  Others  Entrepreneurs  Others 
risk tolerance  5.533  4.806  6.176  5.034 
risk0  0.013  0.031  0.004  0.017 
risk1  0.012  0.034  0.022  0.019 
risk2  0.096  0.093  0.019  0.086 
risk3  0.061  0.135  0.087  0.129 
risk4  0.092  0.111  0.070  0.127 
risk5  0.222  0.220  0.144  0.215 
risk6  0.127  0.126  0.114  0.151 
risk7  0.162  0.147  0.297  0.129 
risk8  0.178  0.080  0.141  0.099 
risk9  0.013  0.017  0.057  0.016 
risk10  0.024  0.006  0.045  0.012 
networth (€100,000)  4.859  0.819  4.029  0.798 
grossinc (€1,000)  4.811  2.519  4.332  2.433 
avgtaxrate  0.351  0.324  0.359  0.315 
highschool  0.447  0.328  0.472  0.368 
apprenticeship  0.319  0.456  0.378  0.431 
highertechncol  0.316  0.262  0.281  0.281 
university  0.378  0.263  0.435  0.282 
female  0.217  0.439  0.246  0.479 
east  0.142  0.192  0.183  0.190 
south  0.301  0.292  0.329  0.303 
north  0.168  0.128  0.095  0.131 
age (years)  45.23  43.08  46.33  43.25 
prworkexp (10 yrs)  1.887  1.785  1.913  1.741 
prunempexp (years)  0.416  0.393  0.465  0.405 
disabled  0.058  0.070  0.069  0.069 
german  0.982  0.966  0.981  0.963 
children (number)  0.557  0.569  0.739  0.530 
married  0.591  0.608  0.604  0.578 
fatherselfempl  0.143  0.088  0.133  0.083 
height (cm)  176.51  173.32  176.45  173.52 
motherhighersec  0.084  0.057  0.108  0.073 
N  371  4888  355  4754 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP (2002/2007). 
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Table A 2: Definitions of Variables 
Variable  Definition 
dependent variable  Share of private business equity in the personal asset portfolio 
risk tolerance  Willingness to take risks on a scale from 0 (risk averse) to 10 (fully prepared to take risks) 
risk0 to risk10  Willingness to take risks: Dummies indicating a point on the 11-point scale 
networth100k  Net worth in €100,000 in prices of 2002 
grossinc  Gross labor income per year (in €1,000) in prices of 2002 
avgtaxrate  Personal average income tax rate = 1 – (net income / gross income) 
d2007  Dummy indicating the year 2007 
highschool  Dummy indicating a high school degree ("Fachhochschulreife" or "Abitur") 
apprenticeship  Dummy for having finished an apprenticeship 
highertechnical  Dummy for having finished a higher technical college or similar 
university  Dummy indicating a university degree 
female  Dummy for women 
east  Dummy indicating residence in one of the 5 new eastern federal states or East Berlin 
south  Dummy indicating residence in one of the southern federal states (Baden-Wuerttemberg or 
Bavaria) 
north  Dummy indicating residence in one of the northern federal states (Schleswig Holstein, 
Lower Saxony, Hamburg, or Bremen) 
age  Age in years 
prworkexp10  Prior work experience (until t-1) in 10 years 
prunemexpexp  Prior unemployment experience (until t-1) in years 
disabled  Dummy for handicapped / physically challenged individuals 
german  Dummy indicating German nationality 
nchildren  Number of children under 17 in the household 
married  Dummy for married individuals 
fatherselfempl  Dummy for individuals with a self-employed father 
height  Body height in cm 
motherhighersec  Dummy indicating that the mother obtained a higher secondary school degree ("Abitur") 
The square of variable x is indicated by x_sq. Dummy variables are equal to one if the condition holds and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table A 3: Portfolio Share of Private Equity: Heckit Estimation Results (SOEP 2002/2007) 
  Heckit (11)  Heckit (12)  Heckit (13)  IV Heckit (14)  FE Heckit (15) 
risk tolerance  0.0053  0.0064    0.1256  0.0196 
  (0.0056)  (0.0071)    (0.1674)  (0.0159) 
risk1      0.1055     
      (0.0841)     
risk2      0.1480**     
      (0.0717)     
risk3      0.2107***     
      (0.0708)     
risk4      0.2560***     
      (0.0725)     
risk5      0.2252***     
      (0.0654)     
risk6      0.1691**     
      (0.0678)     
risk7      0.1831***     
      (0.0675)     
risk8      0.1850***     
      (0.0684)     
risk9      0.1909**     
      (0.0761)     
risk10      0.3587***     
      (0.0827)     
networth100k  0.0030***    0.0029***  0.0061  0.0012 
  (0.0007)    (0.0007)  (0.0047)  (0.0045) 
networth100k_sq  -0.0000***    -0.0000***  -0.0000  -0.0000 
  (0.0000)    (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
grossinc1000  0.0002    0.0000  0.0045  0.0033 
  (0.0011)    (0.0000)  (0.0064)  (0.0071) 
avgtaxrate  0.0251    0.0000  0.1846  -0.1417 
  (0.0766)    (0.0000)  (0.2249)  (0.1699) 
other controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
inv. Mills Ratio        0.2726  0.0200 
        (0.3784)  (0.0931) 
r  -0.0255  -0.0803  -0.0056     
  (0.0960)  (0.2149)  (0.0977)     
se  0.2755***  0.2799***  0.2829***     
  (0.0066)  (0.0077)  (0.0058)     
Wald c
2  372.476  186.302  450.585  130.960   
log likelihood  -2175.915  -2393.679  -2726.190    1028.891 
N  10368  10368  14724  697  697 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2002/2007. 
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Table A 4: Ownership of Private Equity: Estimated Probit Coefficients (SOEP 2002/2007) 
  Probit (11)  Probit (12)  Probit (13)  IV Probit (16) 
risk tolerance  0.0897***  0.0896***    0.4288*** 
  (0.0105)  (0.0092)    (0.0816) 
risk1      0.1262   
      (0.2137)   
risk2      0.1443   
      (0.1819)   
risk3      0.2429   
      (0.1751)   
risk4      0.3027*   
      (0.1743)   
risk5      0.3844**   
      (0.1697)   
risk6      0.4225**   
      (0.1715)   
risk7      0.5681***   
      (0.1695)   
risk8      0.5819***   
      (0.1723)   
risk9      0.7671***   
      (0.1922)   
risk10      1.1892***   
      (0.2122)   
networth100k  372.476    0.1162***  0.0651* 
  -2175.915    (0.0233)  (0.0391) 
networth100k_sq  10368    -0.0002***  -0.0001 
  372.476    (0.0000)  (0.0001) 
grossinc1000  -2175.915    0.0000***  0.0106 
  10368    (0.0000)  (0.0153) 
avgtaxrate  372.476    -0.0000  0.1860 
  -2175.915    (0.0000)  (0.1748) 
fatherselfempl  0.2080***  0.3522***  0.2039***  0.0863 
  (0.0713)  (0.0598)  (0.0712)  (0.0895) 
other controls  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Wald c
2    2153.329 
log likelihood  see Table A 3  -23251.277 
N    9958 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 2002/2007.   36 
Appendix B: Questionnaire Wording 
Questions for private business equity in the SOEP waves 2002 and 2007 
The questions for private business equity in the SOEP waves 2002 and 2007 were posed as 
follows: 1. “Are you the owner of a commercial enterprise, i.e. a company, a shop, an office, a 
practice  or  an  agricultural  enterprise,  or  are  you  involved  in  an  enterprise  such  as  the 
aforementioned?”.  If  this  was  answered  in  the  affirmative,  two  additional  questions  were 
asked: 2. “Are you the sole owner or co-owner of this enterprise, e.g. GBR, GmbH or KG?” 
(the abbreviations are common examples for legal forms in Germany). 3. ”How high do you 
estimate the current value of your enterprise or of your share to be? This is the price before 
tax, which you would receive at the sale of your enterprise or your share, taking into account 
any remaining financial burdens.” The answer was given as euro amount. The questions for 
the other asset categories are similar and explicitly ask for the personal share of assets owned 
jointly, e.g. by a married couple. 
Question for risk attitude in the SOEP waves 2004 and 2006 
The  SOEP  waves  2004  and  2006  asked  the  following  question  about  the  individual  risk 
attitude: “How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take 
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 
means: 'risk averse' and the value 10 means: 'fully prepared to take risks'. You can use the 
values in between to make your estimate.” 